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Abstract: Current migrations in Europe are the result of numerous geostrate-
gic, political, regional, local and individual causes. !ey are multidimensional 
phenomena, whose research requires an interdisciplinary approach. !e work 
examines the social con"icts between the domestic and the settled population, 
especially those based on religious fundamentalism. Firstly, the most impor-
tant characteristics of contemporary Christianity and Islam, as the most domi-
nant religions in post-secular Europe are analysed, described and explained. It 
points to their prevalence, basic values, and religious (non) tolerance. It is em-
phasized that the misunderstanding of these religions is o#en the cause of re-
ligious and other con"icts. !en the social con"icts in di$erent environments 
and the place the religion has in them are explored. !e authors proceed from 
the thesis that con"icts between the domestic population (regardless of religi-
osity) and contemporary migrants are the result of historical, cultural, political 
and other social factors. Con"icts in the name of religion are just one type of 
social con"ict, which o#en conceals other causes. In short, the root causes of 
the con"ict of the local population and migrants in the areas where the afore-
mentioned religions are dominant are explored. !e most important forms, 
dynamics and consequences of these con"icts are listed. It is concluded that 
religious con"icts and contemporary migrations are another factor in the cri-
sis and (dis)integration of Europe.
Kеy words: Europe, Christianity, Islam, migrants, con"icts.
Introduction
In the mass migration of peoples from the Middle East and North Africa 
to Europe, in recent years, the encounter and con"icts of di$erent cultures 
and collective identities, especially those based on religious and ethnic fun-
damentality, are inevitable (Radisavljević-Ćiparizović, 2016a: 90). !e fact 
that two-thirds of migrants in Europe make Muslims is being used by the 
extremists trying to bring fear, both among Christians and among Muslims, 
about the dangers “others” pose to their identity. In the 1rst decade of the 
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XXI century, more than 20 million Muslims lived in Europe: about 2 mil-
lion in Britain, about 5 million in France, about 3 million in Germany. Ac-
cording to Jacques Attali, a French philosopher, in the context of the aging 
of Europe’s population, birth rate and birth defects decline, countries that 
refuse foreigners will experience a decline in population, and those who 
accept them will experience a change in population (Attali, 2010: 117). !e 
most common argument defending the point of view of the con"ict, and 
not the encounter of civilization is the increase in the birth rate of Muslims. 
Just in one century, from 1900 to 2000, the number of Muslims multiplied 
8 times, from 150 million to 1.3 billion people, which makes up about 20% 
of the world’s population (Grčić 2011). !e increase in xenophobia and is-
lamophobia due to the in"ux of migrants has evidently become a part of 
European everyday. !e terrorist attacks of Islamic fundamentalists in Eu-
ropean cities and the strength of the migrant crisis in Europe have con-
tributed to the further spread of Islamophobia. Subject of research: Social 
con"icts between the domestic and immigrant population in Europe, es-
pecially those based on religious fundamentalism "e main hypothesis of 
work: !e growth of religious fundamentalism and mass intercontinental 
migrations as a consequence of globalization and evidence of the crisis in 
Europe. For their part, they contribute to the disintegration of Europe. !e 
social con"icts between the domestic and the immigrant population are the 
result of numerous factors. Religious con"icts are o#en the “mask” for other 
con"icts (economic, ethnic, cultural, historical, political), as indicated by 
con"icts with migrants. Method of research: Current migrations in Europe 
are the result of numerous geostrategic, political, regional, local and indi-
vidual causes. Researching this multi-dimensional phenomenon requires 
an interdisciplinary approach. Sociological analysis of the most important 
causes of con"icts between domestic and internally displaced populations, 
their consequences in di$erent parts of Europe, especially where dominant 
religions are represented.
 Social con"icts can be classi1ed in many ways. !is division is never 
exhaustive, but the most common types of con"ict are listed here. Given 
the number of participants, they can be con"icts between individuals and 
groups, and at the global level, the states and wider regional communities. 
By intensity con"icts are tinting or latent and open or apparent. If they are 
long suppressed, they, very o#en, appear suddenly, powerful and “erup-
tive”. Of course, at the heart of the con"ict are the interests, values, de-
sires of individuals and social groups, for which realization various means 
are used. !ey are peaceful, but also violent, and even warlike (Coser 1956, 
Vidojević, 1993). By their nature, con"icts can be ethnic, cultural, religious, 
class, political, military, etc. !e way they are resolved is di$erent, from a 
peaceful, compromising solution to the imposition of the interest of one of 
the participants in the con"ict. !ey can lead to permanent elimination of 
the opponents, which does not rarely happen in warfare. Con"icts can be 
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manifested in the public sphere, on an institutional level, but also in the 
non-institutional or private sphere of life. !e result of the con"ict depends 
on a number of factors, from individual attributes, but from the structural 
characteristics of the environment in which it occurs.
!e authors begin from the thesis that the real causes of social con"icts 
are o#en blurred, and religious con"icts in contemporary society o#en rep-
resent a mimicry for deeper con"icts of economic, political and geo-strategic 
interests of the main actors on the social scene. In regard to this, the most 
important causes of the con"ict between domestic and internally displaced 
persons in Europe are discussed here, with regard to their religious, cultural 
and ethnic a>liation in particular. Modern migrations are the product of 
at least three factors: the crisis of neoliberal capitalist globalization and the 
growth of economic inequalities and poverty, demographic changes on a 
global scale and distinctively changed relationships in the geopolitical pow-
er of the most important actors on the world stage. In the background of 
interest and con"icts of the most important and powerful countries in the 
world, local and wider wars are waging, both indirect and direct, inspired 
by the struggle for the most important sources of power (energy, raw mate-
rials, strategic roads). Victims of these con"icts of interest are members of 
various ethnic, cultural and religious communities, who are forced to move 
massively. !e work analyzes the basic characteristics of Christianity and 
Islam in contemporary Europe and the most important forms of con"ict 
between the local population and migrants.
Religion in Post-Secular Europe
Today’s world can hardly be understood without the place and role that 
religions have in modern society. Although the catechism of most religions 
is basically non-violent, with an emphasis on peace, social and religious 
practice have shown another face of religion through history. According to 
statistics from 2005, around 2 billion Christians, 1.5 billion Muslims, 900 
million Hindu people and 400 million Buddhists lived in the world.1 Reli-
gion in contemporary society is becoming more and more a matter of col-
lective identity, and not true religiousness (Vukomanović, 2008).
 If, among the sociologists of religion, there is a certain concept of break-
ing the spear, then it is de1nitely secularization. We are in agreement with 
those authors who regard secularization as a complex, contradictory and 
non-linear, thus reversible process (Vrcan, 1986; Radisavljević-Ćiparizović, 
2016b). Secularization is manifested through the weakening of the social 
signi1cance of religion and religious organizations; then, it is also mani-
fested as a process of reducing the connection of people with religion and 
church; Finally, secularization is also manifesting itself as a process that 
1 www.adherents.com for 2005.
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leads to changes in religion itself and religious organizations in response 
to the loss of social functions through an attempt to adapt:  for example, in 
Catholicism aggiornamento.
 Although Europe is the place where secularization theory has experi-
enced its greatest empirical veri1cation, recent research shows that this space 
is not religiously homogeneous (Radisavljević-Ćiparizović, 2016b: 235). We 
agree with Knoblauh’s conclusion that the religious situation in Europe is 
so multifaceted and unequal that it can not be judged by the same measure 
(Knoblauch, 2004: xi). For example, the focus of the British sociology of re-
ligion consists of “believing without belonging”, new religious movements 
and New Age, religious minorities, the organization of religion and its role 
in individual life (Davie, 1994). In the center of French sociology of religion, 
there are new social structures of religious communities, the social conse-
quences of religious pluralism, and especially the urgent issue of Islam and 
the separation of religious faith from religious-institutional dogmas (Her-
vieu-Léger, 2000). However, when reporting on the research of the European 
Values  Study, instead of the term secularization, the inferiority is used be-
cause the population of Europe has not lost its “religious” needs. Europe is 
not religiously homogeneous because there are di$erences between Catholic, 
Protestant and Orthodox populations, between Great Britain and northern 
European countries. !erefore, generalizations can not be easily carried out 
in this narrower space, which is even more important when trying to gen-
eralize the views of secularization and the modern world.
 One of the forms of the return of religion to the public scene is the Cul-
tural Defense (Steve Bruce) “preventing the collapse of a national, ethnic, lo-
cal or some other culture (Gavrilović, 2008: 71). Due to these di$erences in 
the religious situation in Western Europe itself, and based on the results of 
the European Values  Study of 1990, Grays Davies (Davie, 2005: 25–26) con-
ditionally divided these countries into Catholic (Belgium, France, Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal, Spain); con#dently mixed countries (Great Britain, Nether-
lands, Northern Ireland, West Germany) and Lutheran countries (Denmark, 
Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden).2 !e results of the survey show that 
Christian Europe is not exhaustive, especially Lutheran countries, but not 
irreligious (Blagojevic, 2015).3
In Europe, the dominant model is that of a secular state, separated from 
religious communities, religiously plural, and the minimal in"uence of re-
ligion on social life. At the beginning of the 21st century, Europe chose to 
exclude the mention of Christian heritage and Christian values  from the 
text of its Constitution, staying on the provision that accentuates “Cultural, 
2 According to the Grace Dayview division, we analyzed the migration of migrants 
in European countries.
3 See Tables of Religious Self-Identi1cation, Belief in God and Church Visit in Eu-
rope 1999/2001 and 2008 (in %) (M. Blagojević 2015: 45–48).
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religious and humanistic heritage of Europe”.4 At the heart of this attitude 
lies the fear of discrimination of all who have no sense of belonging to the 
Christian tradition. At the beginning of the twenty-1rst century, while Eu-
ropean citizens themselves questioned the scope of liberal democracy, intol-
erance grew among European “indigenous” and increasingly numerous im-
migrants of Islamic religion unprepared for adapting to formal secularism, 
an increase in religious beliefs and the in"uence of religious institutions was 
recorded. Expansion of the Eastern borders European secularism also faced 
with the expressed religious identity of new EU member states such as Bul-
garia, Romania, and then Croatia (Radisavljević-Ćiparizović 2011: 33–34).
 Historically, Islam has been present on the European soil for centuries 
(Spain, the Balkans, Russia). In several West European countries (France, 
Germany, Great Britain), the second or third generation of Muslims is grow-
ing). Europe met with Islam in four ways: conquests (the Pyrénées Peninsu-
la, Ottoman conquests); immigration (from the former European colonies) 
and from the second half of the twentieth century by labor migration, as 
well as conversions. Islam is increasingly becoming an element of European 
culture. In a comparative approach to religions, some authors are starting 
with similarities, and the second is the di$erence between them and their 
followers. !e Quran and the New Testament, are addressing everyone, so 
Islam and Christianity are of the Abrahamic / Abrahamic / Ibrahim, uni-
versal, published, monotheistic religion (the so-called Religion of the Book). 
Both Christians and Muslims are very heterogeneous in terms of national-
ity, education, culture. Di$erences: Christianity was created as a movement 
of the poor, and Islam emerged as a movement of the rich; Christianity (up 
to Constantine) remained the religion of the oppressed, and Islam of the 
religions of the ruling classes. In Christianity, Jesus brought the Annuncia-
tion, in Islam, it is published in the Quran. For Muslims, Jesus is only the 
Prophet who precedes Muhammad, not the son of God. !ey reject the idea 
of  cross and sacri1ce, refusing that Jesus died and resurrected. !ey do not 
accept the dogma of incarnation and redemption. !ey believe that Isa will 
come down at the end of the world and reign over the Sharia; the kingdom 
of Jesus is not from this world, but that of Muhammad is.
Like Judaism and Christianity, Islam is a monotheistic religion based 
on the belief in one God. Muslims use the Arabic word Allah when they 
speak of God to the creator and master of the universe. !e etymological 
word Islam is of Arabic origin and means subjugation, submission to Allah. 
!e disciple of Islam is considered to be a person who before the witness 
states that “there is only one God, Allah, and Muhammad is His Messen-
ger. Muslims believe in the immortality of the soul, in the Judgment Day 
(Qayamat), the a#erlife, the resurrection of the dead, the hell (Jahannam), 
4 !e 1rst European Constitution was signed on 29 October 2004 in Rome by Heads 
of State and Government of the EU.
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the paradise (angel), and the demons (Shaytan) (Cvitković, 2009: 169). Ac-
cording to Islamic belief, God through time sent many revelations to peo-
ple, some of whom were received by Moses and the Christian prophet Jesus. 
Muslims believe that Muhammad is the last prophet through whom Allah 
sent a revelation in the middle of the 7th century, as recorded in the Holy 
Book of the Quran. !e foundation of the Islamic community (ummah) 
is a set of religious laws and obligations under the common name shariat.5 
By sharia, faith is not separated from other aspects of (daily) life (Gordon, 
2001: 10–11). Islam is based on the teachings of the Quran and the Hadith, 
and emphasizes the ritual way of life through the diligent ful1llment of 1ve 
daily prayers, fasting and pilgrimage.6 Islam emerged on the soil of Saudi 
Arabia, from where it spread throughout the world.
Factors of strengthening Islamic fundamentalism and Islamophobia
 In his book Religious Fundamentalism, Klaus Kincler wrote about vari-
ous aspects of fundamentalism in world religions. Since the 1979 Iranian 
Revolution, the term fundamentalism has begun to be used more in con-
nection to Islam. Today, in the West, Muslims are probably better known for 
the persecution of Salman Rushdie, bin Laden, the position of women in the 
society or jihad, rather than for example, its grandiose architecture, poetry, 
philosophy. !e typical characteristics of fundamentalism are: !e return 
to the basics, what was at the beginning, and what was later corrupted; He-
gemony and exclusivity in terms of interpretation; It opposes secularization, 
and the tradition of enlightenment is the enemy of every fundamentalism. 
Fundamentalism is the product of a political, social, economic crisis, or a 
response to crisis. Fundamentalist ideas are ideologically directed against 
science, although in practice they o#en take advantage of modern science 
and technology. !e spirit of ecumenism, dialogue and tolerance are foreign 
to fundamentalism (Vukomanović, 2008: 97). Islamic fundamentalism re-
fers not only to the understanding of the Quran, but also to the entire struc-
ture of the Sharia, the Divine Law formulated on the basis of the Quran in 
the early Middle Ages. It is interpreted as the ultimate and unchangeable 
commandment of God. !e Sharia regulates not only the issues of culture 
and morality, but also behavior in society, food and personal hygiene, and 
much more. !is includes the generally known provisions on the position 
of a woman, that is “worth as a half-man”, banning the consumption of al-
cohol and pork… !e Sharia codex is a huddod – (the term o#en used in 
5 !e Islamic post means not taking food, drink, abstinence from sexual intercourse, 
swearing, and inappropriate actions. It lasts from dawn to sunset.
6 Pillars of Islam: !e basic 1ve obligations of each member of Islam: 1. Shehad – 
confession of faith, 2. Salat – the one-time daily prayer, 3. Zekat – compulsory re-
ligious services, 4. Saum – post during Ramadan and 5. Hajj in Meku (Cvitković, 
2009: 402).
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Islamic literature for the limits of acceptable behavior and for penalties for 
serious o$enses: the#, robbery, extramarital sex, alcohol consumption, and 
false allegations of these o$enses. Sharia also determines the way of dealing 
with members of other faiths. Christians and Jews, “followers of the Book,” 
enjoy certain tolerance, they are considered to be guards (dhimmi). !ey 
are not disassembled, but they are subordinate to the true believers (Kincler, 
2002). According to empirical research on the global scale, most people in 
the world today believe that the main causes of con"ict are political power 
and interest, and not religions and cultures (Vukomanović, 2008: 74). 4).
Extremists try to bring fear among Christians and Muslims alike about 
the danger of “others” for their identity. !e key issue is the question of the 
identity and integration of Muslims into European life. Spain, Belgium and 
Austria formally recognize Islam as a religion. Not only migrations have 
brought the new religious (Islamic) identity closer to the West, but also to 
communications, technology, the media… For Muslims in the EU it is im-
portant whether they want a “European value orientation” or a life in Eu-
rope with a “Muslim value orientation,” or a combination of the 1rst and 
the second. !e most important variant would be the (only) ghettoization 
of Muslims in Europe. Europe has gone secularization, !e Islamic world 
has not. Parliamentary democracy is based on the sovereignty of the peo-
ple, and not God, and for some this is unacceptable to the Islamic world. 
!e West has reduced religion into a private matter, under the in"uence 
of secularization, which has already been done with Christianity. Histori-
cally, Islam has been present on the European soil for centuries (Spain, the 
Balkans, Russia). In more Western European countries (France, Germany, 
Great Britain.), the second or third generation of Muslims is growing.
!e EU (declaratively) protects religious freedoms; Respects diversity; is 
against discrimination on grounds of religion or worldview; Respects the 
legal status that religious communities have in member states; supports 
dialogue with a secularist and secularist culture; renouncing the condem-
nation of any religion and worldview. Being a European means renounc-
ing your identity, which makes it a union of diversity. In Europe, the domi-
nant model is that of a secular state, separated from religious communities, 
along with religious plurality, and with the minimal in"uence of religion on 
social life. Paradoxical images could be seen in the Western Europe at the 
beginning of the 21st century. On one side the sight of the empty churches, 
and on the other – the Muslims, praying in the streets and parks, because 
of the lack of mosques (Paris, London), !e key issue is the question of the 
identity and integration of Muslims into European life. It is not only neces-
sary to emphasize the di$erences, but to emphasize the similarities between 
Christianity and Islam against the growing xenophobia. !e Quran and the 
New Testament are addressed to everyone, so Islam and Christianity are a 
universal religion (the so-called Religion of the Book). Both Christians and 
Muslims are very heterogeneous in terms of nationality, education, culture. 
Religion in Contemporary Society178
Muslims in Europe do not constitute a single community, but are distin-
guished by the diversity of nations, ethnic groups and languages  (Devie, 
2007: 69). !ey are mostly Sunni, but there are Shiites, Ahmadiyya, Alawi-
tes, Su1, Wahhabi… Many Muslims in the EU have been "eeing from wars 
in their countries (from BiH, Sudan, Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Eritrea, 
Chechnya, Syria…) or within the framework of the “family reuni1cation” 
campaign (Turks, Algerians, Moroccans, Indians, Pakistanis…). !en, some 
came to the EU as political asylum seekers, refugees from Islamic countries 
with repressive regimes (Cvitković, 2011).
1. Migrants and social con"icts in Protestant countries
 !e United Kingdom is a predominantly Protestant country and the 
largest ally of the United States in Europe. UK is also an important par-
ticipant in military operations in the areas where migrants come from. Its 
representatives were the most severe towards arrival of migrants. Prime 
Minister David Cameron talked about “overrun” of migrants and agreed 
to accept only 20,000 migrants by 2020 (Blic, September 7, 2015). Foreign 
Minister Boris Jonson requested the return of ships with migrants from the 
Mediterranean (Blic, September 15, 2016). Britain tightened the law on asy-
lum, and the police directly engaged in preventing the arrival of migrants. 
In the port of Dover, there were arrests of migrants, the prevention of entry 
through Eurotunel, as well as the separation of demonstrators who were 
opposed to the acceptance of migrants (Federalna.ba, Janary 30, 2016). Es-
pecially severe were the con"icts in London, Birmingham (Birmingham) 
and some other cities, including right-wing parties. (Blic, June 24, 2017). 
Prior to that, the country was shaken by terrorist attacks. In March 2017, 
the attacker drove into pedestrians on the bridge in London and killed four 
people and wounded a policeman. (Kurir, 23 May 2017). A#er that, the op-
ponents of migration pointed out: “!e time has come for the 1ght against 
Islamic terrorism.” In May 2017, a suicide bomber killed 22 and wounded 
59 people in the concert hall in Manchester (Vujić, 2017). Finally, the protest 
against the host was also expressed by the Poles, whose 680000 live in UK. 
In 2015 they demonstrated wearing T-shirts saying: “Stop blaming us for 
economic problems.” (Blic, August 10, 2015). !e forecasts that in 50 years 
from now Britain will consist of the majority of migrants, is responsible for 
the anti-immigrant groups being reinforced in a special way, further in"u-
encing the decision to leave the EU or Brexit (June 23, 2016).
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2. Migrants and con"icts in predominantly Lutheran countries
According to data from 2002, Denmark had 84% of citizens who are 
members of the Lutheran People’s Church, and only 2% of Muslims.7 In 
2003, this EU member state sent troops to Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2015, 
the right-wing minority government was in power, aimed at reducing the 
number of migrants. In the four largest daily newspapers in Lebanon, an 
announcement was made that migrants do not come to Denmark. It in-
dicated that the social assistance will be reduced by 50%, in the 1rst year 
joining families will not be allowed, and only those who speak the Danish 
language will have the right to stay (Blic, September 8, 2015). In addition to 
the said authorities, it initiated the adoption of a law on the refusal of asy-
lum seekers at borders, and in 2016, she completely gave up the quota to 
receive 500 migrants annually. In everyday life, migrants were attacked by 
ordinary citizens and right-wingers burned camps, banned entry to night 
clubs if English, German or Danish language was not spoken (Blic, January 
19, 2016), and even the police 1ercely fought with young migrants. Intoler-
ance and con"icts grew especially a#er the publication of the caricatures 
of Muhammad, portrayed as terrorists, which caused the mass reaction of 
Muslim believers around the world (p.dw.com, January 30, 2006). !e riots 
were 1erce and more frequent in the suburbs of Copenhagen (for example, 
Norrebro), where religion is part of a collective identity, and unemployment 
and class exclusion of young migrants are higher than the rest of the pop-
ulation. (Horvat, 2008). Denmark has legislated that valuables  and mon-
ey were being taken away from migrants in detention centers whilst they 
were staying in that country. In short, this is an example of the extremely 
restrictive asylum policy and the state’s deterrence of migrants since its ar-
rival in the country.
 Sweden has the most liberal policy towards migrants. It received the 
highest number of migrants in terms of population. Its social system at-
tracted them, so in 2014. 83,000 arrived, and in the next year 163,000. !is 
is the society with the highest pace of growth inequality in the EU, which 
has increased by one third between 1985–2008. (Biznis i #nansije, March 
22, 2013). !is was accompanied by a large spatial and residential segrega-
tion of classes, especially between rich domestic elites and the poor migrant 
population. !e policy of the state was such that, among other things, the 
right wing movements were strengthened. !ey asked for a migration ref-
erendum. !e 1rst and second generation of young people in the special 
neighborhoods of large cities were also dissatis1ed. Dissatisfaction lasted for 
years, individual and group incidents took place, so that at the beginning of 
2017, a “war” broke out in the streets of Sweden (Telegraf, January 27, 2017).
7 See more in: sr.wikipedia.org/wiki/
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 !e causes were di$erent: from the dissatisfaction of the domestic pop-
ulation with the rise of crime, verbal and physical attacks, to the killings 
of young migrants in the isolated Stockholm counties. According to o>-
cial data, the number of violent incidents towards the asylum seekers cen-
ters was 145 in 2014. and 322 in 2015. (Telegraf, January 27, 2016). !ere 
were also setting 1res in the Muslim school and reception centers, massive 
clashes, 1erce battles of migrants and the police, and mass burning of cars 
across Sweden. !e police used weapons. !ere were arrests, injurries, but 
also dead. It was strengthening the moves that were against the ethnic di-
versity of the society, with 40% of those who are foreign-born in the 1rst or 
second generation. !ey emphasized that there is “reverse racizm”, which is 
detrimental to the domestic population (Nima Golam Ali Pur, 2015). Swe-
den has also resorted to deportation of migrants, so it has been planned to 
expel even 80,000 migrants from the country. Labor market researchers in 
these countries have concluded that foreign workers are present in the la-
bor market, especially in the gray economy. !ey di$er signi1cantly from 
foreign workers who came in the 1960s (Novaković, 2008:172, 176; Poleti, 
2013: 341, 344). In short, the religious factor is more concealed here than it 
reveals the real causes of the con"ict in Swedish society. In the foreground 
there are social, spatial, political and cultural di$erences, and in another 
con"ict between Christianity and Islam.
3. Migrants in the countries dominated by Catholicism
Poland belongs to the economically successful new EU members of the 
so-called “Visegrad Group”, whose population is predominantly Catholic. 
!e authority of the authorities towards migrants, especially a#er the Oc-
tober 2015 elections, was markedly hostile. Firstly, the authorities pledged 
to receive 7,000 migrants, but demanded that they be Christians, especially 
women, elderly and children. Later it gave up on any quota. Jaroslav Kachin-
ski, then former prime minister, said that the migrants bring diseases to 
Europe (Kurir, October 14, 2015). On October 25, 2015. his right-wing party, 
Law and Justice, shi#ed the liberal Civil Platform, from the power where it 
has been for 8 years, and won with an absolute majority. Since then, gov-
ernment resistance to EU decisions on migrants has been even greater. !e 
essence of this resistance to Islam and migrants was also expressed by the 
message of Polish football fans from the club Slask Vroclava (November 2, 
2015), which reads: “In Europe, Islam will not spread, we stand in the de-
fense of Christianity” (Telegraf, 02.11.2015).
!ere were frequent incidences of individuals against migrants, but also 
counter demonstrations and demonstrations for migrants. !e 1ercest were 
organized by PEGIDE in February 2016. Some 2,000 demonstrators backed 
the slogan “Poland to Poles”, and nearby around a 100 counterdemonstrators 
acclaimed: “ANTIPEGIDA – against the Fascism in Europe.” (Blic, February 
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6, 2012). At the beginning of January 2017, a 21-year-old Polish man was 
killed by Arab migrants. It was a trigger for the anger, protests and destruc-
tion of the property of migrants by the local population (srbijadanas.net, 
January 2, 2016). Finally, in April 2017, the conservative government decided 
to suspend the reception of migrants. Poland’s Prime Minister Beata Shid-
la stated: “It is certain that no solution can be imposed on member states.” 
(Blic, April 6, 2015). !e government was closer to the decision to provide 
humanitarian aid to refugees in the Middle East.
In Austria, they went from government support that was given to the 
arrival of migrants and massive welcoming by citizens, to the abolition of 
Schengen, controlling and closing the borders for migrants, and the con-
struction of fences to Italy, Slovenia and Croatia, in just a few months. Fi-
nally, a#er a few years there came an announcement from the top of the 
authorities, it said that migrants should not be allowed to enter the Euro-
pean mainland. Austria planned to expel 50,000 migrants by 2019, and the 
authorities acknowledged that “… Austria realized that the desire to receive 
all refugees was a mistake” (Kurir, February 1, 2016).
Migrants who were rebelling to poor housing conditions, were treated 
strictly by the use of force that included deportation from the country. Oth-
er migrants were given a condition to integrate into society, ie, learn a lan-
guage, qualify for entry into the labor market and appreciate values  of their 
hosts. Depending on media control, individual con"icts between the popu-
lation and migrants were being reported about. Finally, the o>cial position 
of the country that the EU should protect external borders contributed to 
this turn in the policy towards migrants. !e Foreign Minister o>cially de-
manded the closure of Muslim nurseries, in which children learn the values 
of Islam (B.A., 2015). Half a year later, a Molotov cocktail was thrown into 
a refugee center near Vienna (Klix.ba, January 27, 2016).
!e intolerance and con"icts have been reared in other events, such as 
the news that a group of migrants raped a 15-year-old Austrian girl (Srbija 
danas, May 20, 2017). !e spiral of protests and violence was fuelled by the 
o>cial politics of Austria. In February 2017, migrants protested in Vienna, 
against the announcement that they would be banned from wearing hijab 
and burqa. Demonstrators exclaimed: “Do not ban scarf,” “I love my hijab”, 
“Islam is an integral part of our identity.” (B92, February 4, 2017). Political 
split between right-wing parties and movements and those who are in the 
presidential election for the bene1t of these others. In essence, the Austrian 
society has remained divided over the migrants.
Hungary is an example of resistance to migrants and violations of the 
basic rules and decisions of the EU institutions during the current migra-
tion crisis. !e right-wing Fides party, headed by Viktor Orban, is in power. 
In the role of the prime minister, he has drawn the main moves during the 
last two years of the migrant crisis in Europe. As early as the summer of 
2015, a decision was made to li# a wire fence towards Serbia, 175 km long 
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and 4 meters high. A#er that, the reception of migrants was halted, and on 
the border with Serbia in the beginning of August 18 migrants who were 
cutting the fence were detained (RTV, August 7, 2015). Due to the slow con-
struction of this fence, the Minister of Defense, Csaba Hende, had to resign. 
Strong police forces clashed with migrants who set o$ from the reception 
camp to Budapest. !e use of pepper spray and clubs were used by the police 
in con"icts with migrants at the Horgos Pass (September 16, 2015) Viktor 
Orban stated that “We do not want to have many Muslims in our country.” 
He explained that it was not a matter of refugees that had been "eeing the 
war. Most of them are economic migrants seeking prosperity. In case of mi-
grants crossing the fence, Orban decided to build another in early 2017, in 
the same place, towards Serbia (Alo, February 23, 2017). In the meantime, 
fences were built towards Croatia and Romania.
Hungary was placing migrants in closed-type camps in the south of the 
country. In June 2016, 300 such migrants were protesting in one such camp 
(Kishunhalas) because of poor housing conditions and slow bureaucracy 
(Blic, June 1, 2016). !ey were waiting for a decision about deportation. !ere 
was almost no solidarity with migrants. At the beginning of October 2016, 
the government held a failed referendum on refugees (Mondo.ba, October 
3, 2016). In March 2017, Parliament passed a law on the closure of asylum 
seekers in closed centers, with no right to freely move, until their asylum 
applications were resolved. Hostility towards migrants and EU institutions 
has intensi1ed so much that Viktor Orban, in the mass protests in Budapest 
in July 2017, demanded the stopping of migration and the abolition of the 
EU (Patriot.rs, July 21, 2016). Under such circumstances, the media reported 
little on the attacks on migrants and their admissions camps. In short, V. 
Orban rejected the Brussels “cosmopolitan immigration policy” and pre-
sented himself as a defender of the nation and Europe.
According to recent data in Slovakia, 62% of the population is of Roman 
Catholic religion. In the current migrant crisis, the government has been 
strongly opposed to the arrival of migrants. It especially emphasized that 
Slovakia does not want Muslims (of which there are 5000 in her popula-
tion and only 3% of all foreigners.8 !e most that it allowed was the 200 mi-
grants of Christian faith, explaining that there were no mosques for Mus-
lims and they could not integrate into society. In the end, it refused to ac-
cept the quota of only 785 migrants. !e arguments for this were di$erent: 
it was required that EU members do not send weapons to Syria, refugee 
adoption would bring security risks to the country, and it would be better 
to send aid and money to the a$ected areas refugees are "eeing from and 
to secure the EU’s borders.
!e most clear in rejecting the admission of Muslim migrants was Prime 
Minister Robert Fico, whose party SMER – Social Democracy has been in 
8 sr.wikipedia.org/wiki/
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power since 2006. As the clashes with migrants were more frequent in Eu-
rope, the rhetoric of R. Fica also intensi1ed. He 1rst stated that: “Let’s be 
honest. We are not even able to integrate hundreds of thousands of our Ro-
mani fellow citizens. How will we integrate people who live in a completely 
di$erent way of life and faith.” (Vujić, 2015). At the beginning of 2016, he 
stressed that “Slovakia must be protected from threats and the only way to 
minimize risks is to prevent the creation of a complete Muslim commu-
nity, which would be caused by the proposed refugee quotas” (Nova srpska 
politička misao, January 8, 2016). He saw the dangers of terrorism at the ar-
rival of Muslims, and the formation of the Islamic community as a threat to 
the Slovak society. He pressed charges against !e European Commission 
for determining the quota of refugees. He has appealed for the deportation 
of migrants. !en he represented himself as a defender of Christianity. In 
that sense, Robert Fica’s stated: “I want clear words. Islam has no place in 
Slovakia. We are not “multi-culty”. We say “No!” And we will not change our 
view” (Nezavisne novine, May 16, 2017). In this way, he opposed the central 
EU institutions and condemned the policy of accepting refugees, calling it 
“ritual suicide”. In June 2015, an anti-immigration protest (several thousand 
participants) was held in Bratislava, with the slogan “Stop Islamizing Eu-
rope – Together Against the Brussels–Europe Dictatorship.” (Pravda, June 
21, 2015). In short, this small and new EU member stood in the defense of 
Christianity and against Islam and migrants.
Before the outbreak of the current migrant crisis in Italy, there was a con-
"ict between the local population and migrants. In 2012, “the government 
passed laws against the stay of foreign workers” (Novaković, 2014: 290). !is 
caused a revolt of migrants, and that year 300,000 foreign workers protested 
in six cities. !e massive arrival of new migrants has further exacerbated 
the situation. !ey were arriving most frequently and massively by the sea. 
!us, in 2014, came 170,000 registered and more illegal immigrants from 
Eritrea, Syria, Tunisia, Mali, Somalia and Ethiopia. By August 2015, the total 
number of registered migrants was 600 000 (Novosti, August 2, 2017). !ese 
were migrants from the war zones. According to Frontex data in 2015, the 
number of dead and missing in the Mediterranean was 3 500, and in 2015 
as many as 30 times more (Milosević, Turudić, 2015).
It was noted that in only three days 2017, 13 000 migrants were rescued 
from Libya to Italy. !e island of Lampedusa, the southernmost point of 
Italy, was o#en the place of arrival and con"ict of migrants, the police and 
the local population. !ere were frequent con"icts of migrants of di$er-
ent religious a>liations on their way to Italy. In April 2015, for example, 15 
Muslim migrants were arrested, suspected of throwing 12 Christians o$ the 
ship (Blic, April 16, 2015). !ere were clashes before the arrival of the Ital-
ian land. In September 2011, there were 55 000 migrants in Lampedusa, al-
most ten times more than the national population. Half a year earlier, 1sh-
ermen blocked the harbor to prevent the entry of migrant ships. Migrants 
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protested over the conditions of accommodation, threatened with burn-
ing gas stations, clashed with natives and police (Vijesti.me, September 21, 
2011). Similar con"icts occurred later and in other places. Especially violent 
clash happened in Milan square, in August 2015 when the police charged 
at migrants who were protesting because of the long await for documents 
and poor living conditions. In May 2017, the police used force dispersing 
migrants (who had trampled tents) on the square in Milan with dogs and 
helicopters (Sarajevo radio, May 3, 2017). In December 2013, at the migrant 
center near Rome, nine migrants sewn up their mouths in protest of poor 
housing conditions (Buka.com, 27. 01. 2014). !is strengthens the anti-mi-
grant attitude of the right-wing League for the North.
According to the data for 2015, France had two thirds of the Catholic 
population, one-fourth of the religiously undecided, 7–9% of the Muslims, 
and other religions. In the current migrant crisis, the country has faced two 
directions of con"ict. !e 1rst was the arrival of new migrants from North 
Africa, and the second, that existed for years, tiring and renewed, the con-
"ict between the domestic population and the second and third generation 
migrants. !eir parents moved from former colonies, and they, as citizens of 
France, and integration into society was not eagerly accepted. “A special prob-
lem is that they” ethnicise “settlements and poverty. Among young people, 
unemployment ranges from 40 to 50 percent” (Novaković, 2014: 289). !e 
number of migrants who arrived in France in recent years was several tens 
of thousands, with the o>cial political elite struggling in all ways to limit 
this number. France was a signi1cant player in military action in all areas 
where the “Arab spring” was happening. Moreover, France is an important 
member of the NATO alliance that bombards and destroys the countries 
that the most migrants come from in Europe. On this occasion we look at 
the attitude of state authorities and citizens towards current migrants from 
the beginning of 2015 to the present day. In this regard, the events in migrant 
camps in Calais, Paris and in the north of France are highlighted. !e con-
"icts in and around them re"ect the essence of the French migrant policy.
During 2015, migrants tried for months to reach the British land. !ey 
built a camp in Calais, where up to 10.000 migrants stayed. !ere were con-
"icts between the migrants, but even more so between migrants and the 
police. In the 1rst place, the residents of Calais protested against the camp 
residents, and then the police forces tried to dismantle them and prevent 
them from passing through Eurotunel. In July 2015, a group of 2000 mi-
grants tried unsuccessfully to pass the tunnel. !e police reacted with force, 
so there were also victims among migrants (Nova srpska politička misao, 
July 29, 2015). When they attempted to evict them from the “Jungle”, the 
migrants were massively opposed. It was a series of 1erce clashes that last-
ed for months. It was ended eventually by the displacement of migrants at 
the end of October 2016 (Novosti, November 10, 2015). !ere was far less 
con"icts in other parts of France. In Paris, police and migrants clashed in 
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gymnasiums where they were staying. A somewhat smaller group of citizens 
have solidarized with migrants (B92, May 4, 2016). In France, the Nation-
al Front strengthened on the wave of anti-immigration policies, which in 
February 2016, for example, aggressively performed in Calais (Blic, Febru-
ary 6, 2016). Both cold and 1rearms were used by the police in these clashes 
between the police and migrants. People were injured, arrested, wounded 
and killed on both sides. Protests against Islamophobia and racism were less 
frequent, less visited and insu>cient to protect migrants more signi1cantly.
France su$ered several major terrorist attacks in the observed period. 
!e 1rst was on January 7, 2015. when 11 people were killed and 12 were 
wounded. !is happened during an armed attack on the editorial sta$ of 
Charie Ebdo satirical magazine in Paris. !e Muslims believed that the 
caricatures of Muhammad were insulting to them, and thus they took ven-
geance in the editorial o>ce. !e second attack took place on July 14, 2015, 
in Nice, when the terrorist 1red at, and then drove a truck into a crowd of 
passers by. !e death toll climbed up to 84, and hundreds were injured. !e 
attacker had French citizenship and was of foreign origin. !e third shook 
Paris in November 2015. !e number of victims was signi1cantly higher. 
About 130 people were killed (Alo, May 23, 2017). !e fear and insecurity of 
the citizens grew. It became clear that terrorism in Europe is gaining new 
dimensions, and Islam is used as a justi1cation for political goals. !e so-
called Islamic State stood behind the executioner of the above-mentioned 
attacks, and stressed that they were 1ghting the state that was waging war 
against it. !ese events have further strengthened Islamophobia in France 
and Europe.
4. Migrants in a predominantly religiously undeclared society
Particularly interesting was the attitude of the Czech political elites to 
migrants. According to the 2011 census, the country is most religiously un-
decided (45.2%), and every third person (34.2) is non-religious. (10.3) and 
the most numerous of the most religiously de1ned are Catholics (10.3).9 In 
such conditions one would expect that there was more tolerance to current 
migrations. In reality, the Czech Republic, certainly not primarily for reli-
gious reasons, strongly opposed the arrival and acceptance of migrants. In 
this respect, the views of President Milos Zeman are most frequently cited. 
He called current migrations a migration of peoples that would destroy Eu-
rope even without terrorism. Some of the arguments against migrants were 
the following: they are people of a di$erent culture and faith, which can 
not be integrated into the Czech society, they will bring infectious diseas-
es, but also terrorism. !erefore, he advocated that the army defended the 
borders of the EU, and economic migrants were deported to the countries 
9 sr.wikipedia.org/wiki/
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from which they came. (Vujić, 2015). Of a similar opinion was also the for-
mer president of Czech Republic Vaclav Klaus. He de1ned the actual mi-
gration as “organized invasion”, triggered by European politicians, human 
rights and the ideology of multiculturalism. !e consequences, he stressed, 
will be a threat to the way of life and European tradition. He concluded that 
“migrants will destroy us without terrorism” (Vesti online, August 23, 2016).
 A quota of 2.000 migrants was granted to the Czech Republic, which it 
refused because, as Interior Minister Milan Hovanec said, “binding quo-
tas are out of common sense” (Blic, September 13, 2015). !erefore, the au-
thorities have advocated that the borders of the EU be defended by NATO, 
and refugees in camps in the Middle East should help 1nancially. !e only 
possibility was the possibility of integrating Christians from Iraq and Syria 
into the Czech society. For all refugees, the rule is that they must respect the 
laws of the host country, or return to their homeland. About 3000 transit 
migrants entered the country, which were placed in special centers. Against 
the arrival of migrants, it was more o#en protested rather than solidarize 
with them. At the beginning of 2015, 500 demonstrators in Prague pointed 
out the slogans “Islam in the Czech Republic we don’t want” and “Islam is 
evil.” !ey demanded that Islam be not recognized as a religious commu-
nity (Vesti online, January 17, 2015). In the protests organized by PEGIDA 
in Prague, there were 4,000 supporters of the “Block against Islam” against 
the Islamists and migrants. In Brno at that time, the banner “Merkel + 
Junker = the Grave of Europe without Children” was highlighted. Exactly 
fewer demonstrators were against Islamophobia (Novosti, February 6, 2016).
From the protests of the migrants, the rebellion and attempted break-
through of the fence around the Bijela camp near Bezdezov in August 2015 
is highlighted. !e police prevented them, and they used tear gas and hand-
cu$s. !ose were men from Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq, under special 
surveillance, which had their mobile phones and money taken away from 
them (Fakti.org/Blobotpor, August 1, 2015). Illegal migrants have been 
placed in ex-prisons, where they have been waiting for deportation. In pro-
test of this, three migrants cut their hands, and 60 men (of all 240) were on 
hunger strike (Kurir, November 11, 2015). !ey were afraid of deportation 
to Austria, and protested against retention in the camp for 90 days. In the 
beginning of May 2017, several thousand people expressed solidarity with 
migrants, and against government policy. Like everywhere, there were in-
dividual attacks on Christian institutions, such as the Orthodox Church in 
Prague. On it, in Cyrillic was written “Allahu Akbar”, “Death is near you”, 
“Your God Allah (Skenderija, 2017).
5. Migrants in the religiously mixed societies of Europe
 Germany is a country with about 30% of Protestants, 30% of Catho-
lics and as many religiously unjust citizens. !e other 10% are Muslims, 
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Orthodox, Jewish, Buddhist and new religious movements. Out of the 82 
million inhabitants, 55 million are Christians and only 3.3 million Muslims.10 
It is the most populous and economically most developed EU member state, 
which played the most important role in the migrant crisis. Chancellor An-
gela Merkel advocated a “open door” policy all the time. !ere are several 
reasons for this. One is a demographic situation, because the population is 
demographically old. Under the age of 14 it is only 14,7%, and older than 
65, it is 18%. Merkel preferred the Syrians, educated and Christians. For all 
others, a#er strict selection, the door was closed, followed by deportation. 
!e mass of migration is re"ected in the fact that in only one weekend (Sep-
tember 7, 2015) 15000 migrants arrived to Germany. By the end of the year, 
1.1 million were registered (RTS, January 16, 2016).
During the resolution of the migration crisis, Germany has violated some 
of the EU’s basic rules and policies, such as the suspension of Schengen, the 
tightening of asylum policy, making ad hoc decisions on the quota of refu-
gees, beyond the normal decision-making procedure through joint EU-28 
institutions. Angela Merkel was the greatest advocate of multiculturalism, 
and then she said that she had completely failed and interpreted it in a way 
that suited her in concrete political circumstances. From the ideology of 
the common life of peoples of di$erent cultures, it has been made clear that 
it is necessary for migrants to respect German customs and culture, and 
Germans theirs (Blic, April 1, 2017). !is, in its own way, strengthened the 
political movements that had been opposed to the migration from the on-
set, especially the arrival of Muslims. Between these extremes can be men-
tioned numerous examples of solidarity with migrants, but also individual 
and group incidents against foreigners.
 In August 2015, a group of 200 right-wing extremists (the National Social 
Democratic Party-NPD initiated a protest) clashed with the police, preventing 
the accommodation of 600 migrants in an abandoned hall in Heydemann. 
!e police used tear gas and pepper spray against them, and they shouted: 
“Strangers Out”, “Germany to Germans” and “Heil Hitler”. On that occasion, 
30 policemen were injured (Kurir, August 12, 2015). !e right-wing move-
ment PEGIDA Coalition, called Patriotic Europeans Against Islamization 
of the West, was fastest growing. In January 2016, when in Dresden, Pegida 
collected 25.000 supporters, in other areas it was di$erent. !e main cause 
of the gathering was the attacks on the Charlie Hebdo magazine in Paris 
and the sexual violence of migrants against women in Cologne (RTS, Janu-
ary 9, 2016). !e greatest success was achieved during the demonstrations 
in February 2016. !e protests were in 25 countries. Only in Dresden 8000 
demonstrators gathered, separated by the police from 3500 demonstrators 
of solidarity with migration. !e main message was – against the Islami-
sation of Europe, and the slogan “We are the people” (Telegraf, February 6, 
10 sr.wikipedia.org/wiki/
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2016). !e dissatisfaction of migrants with the conditions of accommoda-
tion and the attitude of the domestic population towards them o#en burst 
into the public. !e most drastic violence and arrogance were experienced 
by migrants of African and Arab origin during the New Year’s Eve of 2016. 
In Cologne, and later it turned out in other European cities – migrants 
sexually harassed and raped women. It happened on the open ground, in 
the city square in front of the cathedral, and the police did not respond ad-
equately. !e anger of the assaulted women, as well as other citizens, grew 
and buzzed in mass protests across Germany. According to o>cial data, as 
many as 800 women were attacked (Blic, January 22, 2016). It was another 
impetus to all movements against Islam and migrants. A sharper policy of 
acquiring asylum has followed, and faster and more massive deportation 
of such abusers.
It is particularly important to point out that in the meantime, Germany 
was shaken with a wave of terrorist attacks, whose actors are not only cur-
rent migrants. Moreover, some of them are directly linked to the Islamic 
State (ID or ISIS) against which Germany directly 1ghts. In the last two 
years, there have been numerous terrorist attacks in various places, in the 
train, on the street, in the railway station, in markets, in discotheques and 
in the supermarket. !e attackers used cold weapons (knives, axes), but also 
explosives and 1rearms. !e victims were random passers-by, but also spe-
cially chosen. Most terrorists were killed and caught, and some of them were 
directly linked to the ID. !is was con1rmed by the suspicions of those who 
claimed that terrorism was coming up with migrants. Let us just mention 
the attack on people by truck on a Berlin market before the Christmas 2016. 
Several people were killed and 50 were wounded (Blic, December 21, 2016). 
In late July 2017. 18-year-old German citizen of Iranian origin opened 1re 
in Munich “Olimpia” market, killing 9 and wounding 21 people. !e state 
of emergency was declared (RTS, July 22, 2017).
6. Migrants and social con"icts in predominantly Orthodox countries
 On the so-called Balkan path of migrants, there are four predominantly 
Orthodox countries, of which Bulgaria and Greece are EU members, while 
Serbia and Macedonia are on their way to join the EU. Since the beginning 
of the refugee crisis, multiple pressure was on these countries. !e political 
pressure by the most powerful members of the EU was synchronized with 
the pressure of migrants to enter the countries and continue their path to-
wards the most developed countries in Europe. !e government’s attitude 
towards migrants depended on the place in the regional distribution of po-
litical power and the e$orts of the ruling elites to join the EU. In each of 
the countries there was a con"ict between the population and the migrants, 
as well as the use of physical force by the police and the army. !e specif-
ics of relations with migrants in Bulgaria and Greece are summarized here.
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 In order to prevent the massive arrival of migrants, Bulgaria has built 
fences at the borders with Turkey and Macedonia. EU members participated 
in the 1nancing of 200 km of fence, equipping it with state-of-the-art tech-
niques. !e police were assisted by the army and special forces, with the 
aim of reducing the number of illegal migrants. Extremely restrictive poli-
cies towards migrants are also re"ected in almost prison like accommoda-
tion for migrants. !e largest camp was in Haramnli with 3000 inhabitants. 
!e clashes between the police and them were frequent. !e peak was in 
November 2016, when the 1500 migrants burned and broke everything that 
had arrived (Novosti, November 24, 2016). !ey searched for better living 
conditions and shorter retention time. Most of the population, in the town 
and village, protested against migrants (October 29, 2016). At the borders in-
scriptions awated migrants telling them that they better not come, that they 
are not wellcome to stay in Bulgaria because they are poor and have no jobs. 
!e anti migrant policy was even more dominant, including hiring private 
migrant hunters. Former athlete, Dinko Valev was “famous” for this, "y-
ing the helicopter to the authorities and signaled the movement of migrants 
(Danas, April 21, 2016). In addition, the state has done everything to reduce 
the number of migrants, strengthen the conditions for obtaining asylum 
and shorten the time of their stay in the country. !e Bulgarian Orthodox 
Church saw the migrant wave as an “invasion” that, if it remained, threat-
ened to destroy the Bulgarian people (Radio Sarajevo, November 28, 2016).
Greece exhibited relatively least xenophobia and Islamophobia, as it 
was the 1rst to face the gust of migrants. In Greece, more than 50,000 mi-
grants were captured in 2016 alone. !e arrival by the sea was the main 
migrant route. !is led to the overcrowding of the islands and migratory 
camps (Lesbos, Hios for example). !is led to frequent con"icts with the 
local population as well as the police. In Lesbos, the living conditions were 
desperate, and emergency doctors also went on strike (Politika, April 24, 
2016). !e more intensifying the migrant crisis in Europe the more Greece 
paid a higher price. !ere has not been any real and substantial help from 
other EU member states, and the treaty with Turkey is poorly respected. In 
particular, members of the right-wing Golden Dawn protested against the 
migrants, but they were few and later forbidden. !ousands of citizens of 
Athens and others have repeatedly and massively solidi1ed with the mi-
grants (Mondo.me, March 10, 2017) On the other hand, migrants have pro-
tested against di>cult accomodation conditions, long waiting for documents 
and the attitude of the police and the state towards them. Interestingly, the 
Greeks did not complain about migrants by emphasizing their belonging 
to another religion and culture. !ey were primarily against their arrival 
for economic reasons, because they were already over-indebted and poor. 
Every fourth Greek le# the country beforehand, and new migrants were 
not seen as a factor in solving demographic problems. !ey were seen as a 
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common problem of the EU, so the authorities advocated that these prob-
lems be jointly resolved by EU members.
Instead of the conclusion
In the suppression of (religious) xenophobia, it is not only necessary to 
emphasize di$erences, but to emphasize the similarities between Christi-
anity and Islam. In addition to the fear of Islamic fundamentalism and ter-
rorist attacks, the inadequate and uncoordinated responses of the European 
Union to the migration crisis also fuel Islamophobia. !e text highlights 
the most important forms of social con"icts between individuals belong-
ing to di$erent religious, racial, cultural, political and ethnic groups on the 
ground of today’s Europe. !e relationship between them is complex and dif-
1cult to be reduced to one dimension of con"ict. Moreover, there is a whole 
plexus of global, local and individual factors that determine the relations 
between the domestic and the migrant population. Investigating these re-
lationships in communities where the religious and confessional a>liation 
of the population di$ers suggests that other, political, geostrategic factors 
are important for the universality of these relations and the outcome of the 
above-mentioned con"icts. According to empirical research on the global 
scale, most people in the world today believe that the main causes of con"ict 
are political power and interest, and not religion and culture. !e interdis-
ciplinarity of access to these con"icts could scienti1cally explain and reveal 
many other causes of con"ict and the mechanisms of their concealment and 
resolution. !e most basic forms of con"icts between members of di$erent 
religious, ethnic and cultural communities are only brie"y sketched here.
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